Message Text

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

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FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: N/A TAGS: PARM. NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: OESER PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT

DEC 16, 1976

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF PRESS CONFERENCE STATEMENT MADE BY AMB OESER (GDR) AFTER FINAL (123RD) PLENARY SESSION OF ROUND TEN. TEXT OF Q'S AND A'S FOLLOWS SEPTEL.

BEGIN TEXT:

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

1. STRIKING THE BALANCE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE 10TH ROUND AND AT THE END OF THE YEAR OF 1976 WE PROCEED FROM THE CONCEPT THAT ACHIEVING PROGRESS IS BOTH POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY.

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2. IN THE DECLARATION OF BUCHAREST OF THE POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE THE WARSAW TREATY STATES EMPHATICALLY REAFFIRMED THEIR WILL, ON A GLOBAL AS WELL AS A REGIONAL LEVEL TO DO ALL THEY CAN FOR THE CESSATION OF THE ARMS RACE, FOR DISARMAMENT AND THE DIMINUTION OF THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR. IN THIS CONNECTION THEY ALSO STRESSED THE NEW INITIATIVES LATELY TAKEN BY THEM IN

VIENNA. THE ENDEAVOURS OF THE SOCIALIST STATES AIMED AT A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF THE CONCENTRATION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE FORM PART OF THEIR COMPREHENSIVE DISARMAMENT PROGRAMME COMPRISING NUMEROUS IDEAS OF OTHER STATES. IT REACHES FROM CONCRETE MEASURES OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT VIA THE DRAFT AGREEMENT ON NOT BEING THE FIRST TO USE NUCLEAR ARMS AMONG THE SIGNATORY STATES OF THE FINAL ACT OF HELSINKI TO THE PROPOSALS FOR THE REDUCTION OF CONVENTIONAL ARMAMENTS.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN.

- 3. THE DECISIVE ACTIONS TAKEN THIS YEAR IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES OF 19 FEB 1976 AND THE DATA SUBMITTED TO GIVE IT A MORE CONCRETE CHARACTER ON THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE GROUND AND AIR FORCES OF THE WARSAW TREATY STATES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS HAD SHOWN POLITICAL READINESS TO RESPOND TO THEM MATTER-OF-FACTLY, CONSIDERABLE PROGRESS COULD HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED ALREADY.
- 4. WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, HOWEVER, ALSO IN THE 10TH ROUND HAVE NOT GIVEN A CONSTRUCTIVE ANSWER TO OUR INITIATIVES. THIS HAMPERS THE NEGOTIATIONS.
- 5. IN THE LIGHT OF THIS SITUATION THE SOCIALIST DELEGATIONS
 RENEWED THEIR PROPOSAL TO THE EFFECT THAT ALL PARTICIPATING
 STATES SHOULD NOT INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR
 ARMED FORCES DURING THE NEGOTIATING PERIOD. NO POSITIVE RESPONSE
 WAS GIVEN TO THIS EITHER, ALTHOUGH STATEMENTS MADE BY WELLKNOWN WESTERN POLITICIANS HAS RAISED HOPES FOR A MORE REASONABLE
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ATTITUDE. SUCH STATEMENTS FURNISH EVIDENCE OF A GROWING KNOWLEDGE EVEN AMONG THESE POLITICIANS THAT THE DESTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE TAKEN BY WESTERN PARTICIPATING STATES INCREASINGLY CONTRASTS WITH THE DEMANDS OF PEOPLES TO END THE ARMS RACE.

6. THE DISCUSSIONS OF THE 10TH ROUND HAVE MADE OBVIOUS THAT OUR PROPOSAL OF 19 FEB FORMS THE KEY TO A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE REALISTIC SOLUTION.

FIRST, IT PROCEEDS FROM THE FACT THAT THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN A COMPLEX ASSESSMENT OF ALL FACTORS IS MARKED BY AN APPROXIMATE EQUILIBRIUM. US PRESIDENT GERALD FORD, TOO, IN HELSINKI ONE YEAR AGO CONFIRMED THE EXISTENCE IN EUROPE OF AN EQUILIBRIUM AND A STABILITY THAT, IN THE CASE OF FORCES REDUCTIONS, WOULD HAVE TO BE MAINTAINED. FRG CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT WAS TALKING HERE IN VIENNA JUST A FEW MONTHS AGO ABOUT THE CONTINUANCE OF THE SECURITY BALANCE. TO MAINTAIN THE EXISTING RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES BEING AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE POSITIVE

DEVELOPMENT OF RECENT YEARS SERVES THE CONTINUOUS PURSUANCE OF THE PROCESS OF DETENTE.

SECOND, THE PROPOSAL GUARANTEES AN EQUITABLE AND EFFECTIVE OUTCOME FOR ALL PARTICIPANTS. THE ONLY PRACTICABLE METHOD TO BE USED IN THIS CONNECTION IS THE REDUCTION OF THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF ALL 11 DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES BY EQUAL PERCENTAGES, NAMELY IN THE FORM OF MILITARY FORMATIONS OF THE SAME TYPES, OF GROUND AS WELL AS AIR FORCES WITH THEIR ARMAMENTS, INCLUDING NUCLEAR FORCES.

THIRD, IT ESTABLISHED A COMPROMISE BASIS: WE AGREED ON DIVIDING THE REDUCTION PROCESS IN TWO PHASES. IN THE FIRST PHASE ONLY SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES ARE TO BE REDUCED.

7. TO HELP STARTING THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS, WHILE TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE NUMBERS AND TYPES MENTIONED IN THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF DEC 1975, IT PROVIDES FOR THE REDUCTION BY THE SOVIET UNCLASSIFIED

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UNION AND THE UNITED STATES OF SOME COMPARABLE CONCRETE ARMS SYSTEMS, AMONG THEM FIRST OF ALL DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF NUCLEAR ARMS.

8. THE REMAINING STATES PARTICIPANTS, AMONG THEM THE WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA, ARE AT FIRST MERELY TO FREEZE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ASSUME GENERAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING THE SCOPE AND TIMING OF THE REDUCTIONS OF A SECOND PHASE.

9. WITH THIS MOVE TO MEET THEIR WESTERN PARTNERS THE SOCIALIST STATES THUS HAVE TAKEN UP ALSO THE MODIFICATION OF THE WESTERN SCHEME OF LAST YEAR TO THE EXTENT POSSIBLE IN A CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER. THE ASSERTION MADE BY NATO STATES THAT A RESPONSE TO THIS WAS STILL OUTSTANDING IS THEREFORE MISLEADING AND UNTENABLE. REPEATING THIS ARGUMENT IN A STEREOTYPED MANNER IS A USELESS ATTEMPT TO DISTRACT ATTENTION FROM THE FACT THAT WESTERN STATES PARTICIPANTS DISPLAYED NO READINESS FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE AND THAT THEY, WITHOUT BEING READY FOR A COMPROMISE, ALSO IN THE 10TH ROUND STUCK TO THEIR UNILATERAL BASIC SCHEME OF 1973.

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10. THEY ARE CONSTRUCTING A PICTURE OF THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAT IGNORES FACTS IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY THEIR UNACCEPTABLE DEMANDS RUNNING COUNTER TO THE UNDIMINISHED SECURITY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES

11. THEY ARE DEMANDING FROM THE SOCIALIST STATES THREE TIMES BIGGER NUMERICAL REDUCTIONS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES.

12. THE USSR IS TO REDUCE A COMPLETE TANK ARMY WITH ALL ITS ARMAMENT AND EQUIPMENT WHILE THE USA INTENDS TO THIN OUT ONLY INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS FROM THEIR MILITARY FORMATIONS WHICH CONTINUE TO EXIST WITH THEIR ENTIRE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT.

13. NATO STATES IN PRINCIPLE REJECT FOR THEMSELVES ANY REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS. THE REDUCTION OF SOME US NUCLEAR ARMS IS TO BE CONSIDERED A "ONE-TIME" EXCEPTION AND IS TO LEAVE OPEN THE POSSIBILITY THAT ESPECIALLY THE OTHER NATO STATES WILL FURTHER UNCLASSIFIED

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INCREASE THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY FOR NUCLEAR ARMS AND THUS BE ABLE TO MORE THAN JUST REPLACE THE REDUCED ARMS SYSTEMS. THEY REFUSE A REDUCTION OF THE AIR FORCES.

14. WESTERN EUROPEAN STATES AND CANADA ARE UNWILLING TO PROVIDE MINIMUM GUARANTEES FOR THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES IN A SECOND PHASE AND TO SHOW AT ALL ANY POLITICAL READINESS FOR A MUTUAL DISARMAMENT.

15. ALL THIS CONTRADICTS THE CLEARLY STIPULATED TASK OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH IS THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. IT IS NOT ORIENTED ON THE AIM, ON A MUTUAL BASIS TO ACHIEVE A REDUCTION OF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE BUT, ON THE CONTRARY, MERELY SERVES THE STRATEGIC PLANS OF NATO TO CHANGE THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES.

16. WHILE NATO STATES WERE CONDUCTING THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA IN AN IMMOBILE WAY AND EVEN REFUSED TO FREEZE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF FORCES THEY ACCOMPLISHED AN EXTENSIVE QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE REINFORCEMENT OF THEIR ARMED FORCES IN THE COURSE OF 1976. NATO BODIES DECIDED IN THE YEARS TO COME TO FURTHER INTENSIFY THIS COURSE OF REARMAMENT AND TO INCREASE MILITARY EXPENDITURES BY AN ENORMOUS SUM. WHILE IN VIENNA THEY ARE REFUSING TO REDUCE AND LIMIT THE AIR FORCES THEY ARE SPEEDING UP THE EXTENSION PARTICULARLY OF THIS ARMED SERVICE WHICH COVERS AT THE SAME TIME A LARGE PART OF THE NUCLEAR FORCES.

17. THE COURSE OF CONTINUING THE ARMS RACE AND THE REFUSAL TO TAKE REASONABLE STEPS TOWARDS DISARMAMENT IMBUE THE PEOPLES WITH SORROW.

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN,

18. THE YEAR OF 1976 THUS IS CHARACTERIZED BY AN ACTIVE POLICY OF THE SOCIALIST STATES DIRECTED TOWARDS RESULTS OF THE UNCLASSIFIED

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VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS TO STRENGTHEN PEACE AND STABILITY IN EUROPE.

19. COMPARED WITH THIS THERE IS A DEFICIT ON THE SIDE OF NATO STATES. WE EXPECT THEM IN THE NEW YEAR TO CHANGE THEIR UNREALISTIC POSITIONS AND TO ENTER INTO THE CONSTRUCTIVE DIALOGUE THAT HAS BEEN OFFERED. THEY HAVE TO ACT NOW*

20. AS HAS BEEN STATED IN BUCHAREST BY THEIR HIGHEST REPRESENTATIVES THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE READY "TO MAKE FURTHER ENDEAVOURS TO WORK OUT A GENERALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT."

 $21.\,\mathrm{THE}$ GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC WILL ACTIVELY CONTRIBUTE TO THIS.

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